We show that a recently proposed construction by Rosen and Segev can be used for obtaining the first public key encryption scheme based on the McEliece assumptions which is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks in the standard model.
Introduction
Indistinguishability of messages under adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks is the strongest known notion of security for public key encryption schemes (PKE). Many computational assumptions have been used in the literature for obtaining cryptosystems meeting such a strong security requirements. Given one-way trapdoor permutations, we know how to obtain CCA2 security from any semantically secure public key cryptosystem [14, 20, 12] . Efficient constructions are also known based on number-theoretic assumptions [6] or on identity based encryption schemes [3] . Obtaining a CCA2 secure cryptosystem (even an inefficient one) based on the McEliece assumptions in the standard model has been an open problem in this area for quite a while.
Recently, Rosen and Segev proposed an elegant and simple new computational assumption for obtaining CCA2 secure PKEs: correlated products [19] . They provided constructions of correlated products based on the existence of certain lossy trapdoor functions [16] which in turn can be based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem and on Paillier's decisional residuosity problem [16] .
In this paper, we show that the ideas of Rosen and Segev can also be applied for obtaining the first construction of a PKE built upon the McEliece assumptions. Based on the definition of correlated products [19] , we define a new kind of PKE called k-repetition CPA secure cryptosystem and show that the construction proposed in [19] directly translates to this new scenario. We then show that a randomized version of the MCEliece cryptosystem [15] is k-repetition CPA secure and obtain a CCA2 secure scheme in the standard model. The resulting cryptosystem enciphers many bits as opposed to the single-bit PKE obtained in [19] . We expand the public and private keys and the ciphertext by a factor of k when compared to the original McEliece PKE. Additionally, our result implies a new construction of correlated products based on the McEliece assumptions.
In a concurrent and independent work [9] , Goldwasser and Vaikuntanathan proposed a new CCA-secure public-key encryption scheme based on lattices using the construction by Rosen and Segev. Their scheme assumed that the problem of learning with errors (LWE) is hard [18] .
Preliminaries

Notation
If x is a string, then |x| denotes its length, while if |S| represents the cardinality of a set S. If n ∈ N then 1 n denotes the string of n ones. s S denotes the operation of choosing an element s of a set S uniformly at random. w A(x, y, . . .) represents the act of running the algorithm A with inputs x, y, . . . and producing output w. We write w A O (x, y, . . .) for representing an algorithm A having access to an oracle O. We denote by Pr[E] the probability that the event E occurs. If a and b are two strings of bits or two matrices, we denote by a|b their concatenation. The transpose of a matrix M is M T . If a and b are two strings of bits, we denote by a, b their dot product modulo 2 and by a ⊕ b their bitwise XOR. U n is an oracle that return a random element of {0, 1} n .
Public-Key Encryption Schemes
A Public Key Encryption Scheme (PKE) is defined as follows:
(Public-Key Encryption). A public-key encryption scheme is a triplet of algorithms (Gen, Enc, Dec) such that:
-Gen is a probabilistic polynomial-time key generation algorithm which takes as input a security parameter 1 n and outputs a public key pk and a secret key sk. The public key specifies the message space M and the ciphertext space C.
-Enc is a (possibly) probabilistic polynomial-time encryption algorithm which receives as input a public key pk and a message m ∈ M, and outputs a ciphertext c ∈ C. -Dec is a deterministic polynomial-time decryption algorithm which takes as input a secret key sk and a ciphertext c, and outputs either a message m ∈ M or an error symbol ⊥. -(Soundness) For any pair of public and private keys generated by Gen and any message m ∈ M it holds that Dec(sk, Enc(pk, m)) = m with overwhelming probability over the randomness used by Gen and Enc.
Below we define indistinguishability against chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) [8] and against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) [17] . Our game definition follows the approach of [10] . 
We define the advantage of A in the experiment as 
The adversary A 2 is not allowed to query Dec(sk, · ) with c * . We define the advantage of A in the experiment as
We say that PKE is indistinguishable against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) if for all probabilist polynomial time (PPT) adversaries A = (A 1 , A 2 ) that makes a polynomial number of oracle queries the advantage of A in the experiment is a negligible function of n.
McEliece Cryptosystem
In this Section we define the McEliece cryptosystem [13] . We closely follow [15] . The McEliece PKE consists of a triplet of probabilistic algorithms (
-The probabilistic polynomial-time key generation algorithm, Gen McE , works as follows:
1. Generate a l × n generator matrix G of a Goppa code, where we assume that there is an efficient error-correction algorithm Correct which can always correct up to t errors. 2. Generate a l × l random non-singular matrix S. 3. Generate a n × n random permutation matrix T.
l , C = {0, 1} n . 5. Output pk = (P, t, M, C) and sk = (S, G, T).
-The probabilistic polynomial-time encryption algorithm, Enc McE , takes the public-key pk and a plaintext m ∈ {0, 1} l as input and outputs a ciphertext c = mP ⊕ e, where e ∈ {0, 1} n is a random vector of Hamming weight t. -The deterministic polynomial-time decryption algorithm, Dec McE , works as follows:
In our work we use a slightly modified version of the McEliece PKC. Instead of creating an error vector by choosing it randomly from the set of vectors with Hamming weight t, we generate e by choosing each of its bits according to the Bernoulli distribution B θ with parameter θ = t n − for some > 0. Clearly, due to the law of large numbers, the resulting error vector should be within the error capabilities of the code.
McEliece Assumptions
In this subsection, we briefly introduce and discuss the McEliece assumptions.
We assume that there is no efficient algorithm which can distinguish the scrambled (according to the description in the previous subsection) generating matrix of the Goppa code P and a random matrix of the same size. The best algorithm attacking this assumption is by Courtois et al. [5] and it is based on the support splitting algorithm [21] .
Assumption 4 There is no PPT algorithm which can distinguish the public-key matrix P of the McEliece cryptosystem from a random matrix of the same size with non-negligible probability.
We note that this assumption was utilized in [5] to construct a digital signature scheme.
We also assume that the Syndrome Decoding Problem is hard. This problem is known to be NP-complete [1] , and all currently known algorithms to solve this problem are exponential. The best algorithms were presented by Canteaut and Chabaud [4] and recently by Bernstein et al. [2] .
Assumption 5 The Syndrome Decoding Problem problem is hard for every PPT algorithm.
This problem is equivalent to the problem of learning parity with noise (LPN). Below we give the definition of LPN problem following the description of [15] .
For an adversary A trying to discover the random r, we define its advantage as:
The LPN θ problem with parameter θ is hard if the advantage of all PPT adversaries A that makes a polynomial number of oracle queries is negligible.
Admissible PKE
Below we define admissible PKEs which are known to imply IND-CPA security [15] . In the following, Enc(pk, m, r) denotes a public key encryption scheme enciphering a message m with a public key pk and randomness r. -Dividability: Enc 1 takes as input the public key pk and r ∈ R, and outputs a p(n) bit-string. Enc 2 takes as input the public key pk and m ∈ M, and outputs a p(n) bit-string. Here p is some polynomial in n. Then for any pk generated by Gen, r ∈ R and m ∈ M, Enc 1 (pk, r) ⊕ Enc 2 (pk, m) = Enc(pk, m, r). -Pseudorandomness: Consider a probabilistic polynomial time adversary A against PKE, we associate with it the following experiment Exp ind PKE,A (n):
Signature Schemes
We explain signature schemes (SS) and define one-time strongly unforgeability.
Definition 8. (Signature Scheme).
A signature scheme is a triplet of algorithms (Gen, Sign, Ver) such that:
-Gen is a probabilistic polynomial-time key generation algorithm which takes as input a security parameter 1 n and outputs a verification key vk and a signing key dsk. The verification key specifies the message space M and the signature space S.
-Sign is a (possibly) probabilistic polynomial-time signing algorithm which receives as input a signing key dsk and a message m ∈ M, and outputs a signature σ ∈ S. -Ver is a deterministic polynomial-time verification algorithm which takes as input a verification key vk, a message m ∈ M and a signature σ ∈ S, and outputs a bit indicating whether σ is a valid signature for m or not (i.e., the algorithm outputs 1 if it is a valid signature and outputs 0 otherwise). -For any pair of signing and verification keys generated by Gen and any message m ∈ M it holds that Ver(vk, m, Sign(dsk, m)) = 1 with overwhelming probability over the randomness used by Gen and Sign. 
We say that a signature scheme SS is one-time strongly unforgeable if for all probabilist polynomial time (PPT) adversaries A = (A 1 , A 2 ) the probability that Exp otsu SS,A (n) outputs 1 is a negligible function of n.
3 k-repetition PKE
Definitions
We define a k-repetition Public-Key Encryption.
Definition 10. (k-repetition Public-Key Encryption). For a PKE (Gen, Enc, Dec), we define the k-repetition public-key encryption scheme (PKE k ) as the triplet of algorithms (Gen k , Enc k , Dec k ) such that:
-Gen k is a probabilistic polynomial-time key generation algorithm which takes as input a security parameter 1 n and calls the PKE's key generation algorithm k times obtaining the public keys (pk 1 , . . . , pk k ) and the secret keys (sk 1 , . . . , sk k ). Gen k sets the public key as pk = (pk 1 , . . . , pk k ) and the secret key as sk = (sk 1 , . . . , sk k ).
-Enc k is a (possibly) probabilistic polynomial-time encryption algorithm which receives as input a public key pk = (pk 1 , . . . , pk k ) and a message m ∈ M, and outputs a ciphertext c = (c 1 , . . . , c k ) = (Enc (pk 1 , m) , . . . , Enc(pk k , m)). -Dec k is a deterministic polynomial-time decryption algorithm which takes as input a secret key sk = (sk 1 , . . . , sk k ) and a ciphertext c = (c 1 , . . . , c k ). It outputs a message m if Dec(sk 1 , c 1 ) , . . . , Dec(sk k , c k ) are all equal to some m ∈ M. Otherwise, it outputs an error symbol ⊥. -(Soundness) For any k pairs of public and private keys generated by Gen k and any message m ∈ M it holds that Dec k (sk, Enc k (pk, m)) = m with overwhelming probability over the randomness used by Gen k and Enc k .
We also define security properties that the k-repetition Public-Key Encryption scheme used in the next sections should meet.
Definition 11. (Security under uniform k-repetition of IND-CPA schemes).
We say that PKE k (built from an IND-CPA secure scheme PKE) is secure under uniform k-repetition if PKE k is IND-CPA secure.
Definition 12. (Verification under uniform k-repetition of IND-CPA schemes).
We say that PKE k is verifiable under uniform k-repetition if given a ciphertext c ∈ C, the public key pk = (pk 1 , . . . , pk k ) and any sk i for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, it is possible to verify if c is a valid ciphertext.
IND-CCA2 Security from CPA Secure k-repetition PKE
In this subsection we describe the IND-CCA2 secure public key encryption scheme (PKE cca2 ) and prove its security. We assume the existence of an onetime strongly unforgeable signature scheme and of a PKE k that is secure and verifiable under uniform k-repetition.
Key Generation: Gen cca2 is a probabilistic polynomial-time key generation algorithm which takes as input a security parameter 1 n . Gen cca2 does as follows:
1. Calls the PKE's key generation algorithm 2k times obtaining the public keys (pk (c 1 , . . . , c k ) ). 4. Outputs the ciphertext c = (c 1 , . . . , c k , vk, σ). Decryption: Dec cca2 is a deterministic polynomial-time decryption algorithm which takes as input a secret key sk = (vk * , sk The probability that Dec cca2 (sk, Enc cca2 (pk, m)) = m is the same as the probability that vk = vk * , but this probability is negligible since the signature scheme is one-time strongly unforgeable.
As in [19] , we can apply a universal one-way hash function to the verification keys (as in [7] ) and use k = n for a constant 0 < < 1. For ease of presentation, we do not apply this method in our scheme description.
Theorem 1.
Given that SS is a one-time strongly unforgeable signature scheme and that PKE k is secure and verifiable under uniform k-repetition, the public key encryption scheme PKE cca2 is IND-CCA2 secure.
Proof. In this proof we closely follow [19] . Denote by A the IND-CCA2 adversary. Let Forge be the event that for some decryption query made by A we have that Ver (vk, (c 1 , . . . , c k ), σ) = 1 and vk = vk * . The theorem follow from the two lemmas below.
Proof. Assume that for a PPT adversary A against PKE cca2 the forge probability (Pr [Forge] ) is non-negligible, then we construct an adversary A that forge a signature with the same probability. A simulates the IND-CCA2 interaction for A as follows:
Key Generation: A invokes the key generation algorithm of the signature scheme and obtains vk * . It calls the PKE's key generation algorithm 2k times obtaining the public keys (pk 2. Encrypts the message m b using the procedures of PKE cca2 . This is possible because A can ask the signature oracle to sign one message, so it asks the oracle to sign the value (c 1 , . . . , c k ) obtained during the encryption process.
As long as the event Forge did not occur, the simulation is perfect, so the probability that A breaks the one-time strongly unforgeable signature scheme is exactly Pr [Forge] . Since the signature scheme is strongly unforgeable by assumption, Pr[Forge] is negligible for all PPT adversaries against PKE cca2 . Key Generation: A receives as input the public key (pk 1 , . . . , pk k ) of PKE k .
A proceeds as follows: 1. Runs the key generation algorithm of the signature scheme and obtain the verification key vk * and the signing key dsk * . 
Sets pk
